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Why	the	United	States’	maximum	pressure	approach
towards	Nicolás	Maduro	is	unlikely	to	stabilise
Venezuela
At	the	end	of	March,	the	US	Justice	Department	charged	Venezuelan	president	Nicolás	Maduro	and
other	government	officials	with	“narcoterrorism”.	Along	with	sanctions	and	naval	counternarcotics
operations	near	Venezuela,	the	charges	are	part	of	the	Trump	administration’s	campaign	to	oust
Maduro.	Even	if	this	strategy	ultimately	proves	successful,	it	will	do	little	to	help	re-establish
democracy	in	the	long	term,	writes	John	Polga-Hecimovich	(US	Naval	Academy).
The	United	States	appears	bound	to	a	maximum	pressure	strategy	to	force	Venezuelan	president	Nicolás	Maduro
from	power.	On	top	of	layers	of	economic	sanctions,	on	26	March	US	Attorney	General	William	Barr	issued	charges
of	“narco-terrorism”,	drug	trafficking,	and	corruption	against	Maduro,	Defence	Minister	General	Vladimir	Padrino
López,	and	a	dozen	other	government	officials,	offering	a	$15	million	reward	for	information	leading	to	Maduro’s
capture	and	conviction.	Save	for	Manuel	Noriega	in	1988,	the	indictment	of	a	ruling	head	of	state	is	unprecedented
and	underscores	the	campaign	of	coercive	diplomacy	the	US	is	pursuing	to	unseat	the	Venezuelan	dictator.
The	US	Drug	Enforcement	Administration	has	officially	put	a	price	on	the	head	of	Venezuela’s	president
(DEA,	public	domain)
The	US	has	added	other	measures:	it	deployed	Navy	forces	near	Venezuela	in	April,	ostensibly	for	drug
interdiction,	and	then	issued	a	license	to	energy	company	Chevron	to	stay	in	Venezuela	until	1	December	2020,	but
essentially	barred	the	company	from	producing	oil	in	the	meantime.	Meanwhile,	Maduro	is	scrambling	to	face	the
challenges	posed	by	the	collapse	of	international	crude	prices	as	well	as	the	dangers	of	the	COVID-19	pandemic.
Once	again,	Maduro	appears	to	be	in	a	vulnerable	position.
How	did	we	get	here?
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Since	Maduro	took	office	in	April	2013	after	the	death	of	his	mentor	Hugo	Chávez,	Venezuela	has	descended	from
a	hybrid	regime	–	combining	democratic	and	authoritarian	traits	–	into	an	outright	dictatorship.	Maduro	postponed	a
recall	referendum	against	him	in	late	2016	and	was	re-elected	in	a	fraudulent	election	in	May	2018,	closing	off
institutional	channels	of	political	change.	During	this	time,	the	country’s	economy	contracted	and	hyperinflation	left
a	majority	of	the	population	mired	in	poverty,	both	factors	contributing	to	the	more	than	4.5	million	people	who	have
emigrated.
On	the	basis	of	the	flawed	presidential	election,	the	political	opposition	used	a	constitutional	article	to	declare	the
office	of	the	president	vacant,	and	voted	in	Juan	Guaidó,	then	president	of	the	National	Assembly	of	Venezuela,	as
interim	president	in	January	2019.	Many	democratic	governments	around	the	world	subsequently	recognised
Guaidó,	while	Maduro	retains	the	backing	of	the	armed	forces	and	the	leaders	of	Russia	and	China,	amongst
others.	The	Donald	Trump	administration,	meanwhile,	has	promised	to	unseat	Maduro,	pursuing	an	escalating
series	of	economic	sanctions	against	individuals	and	the	state-owned	oil	company	Petróleos	de	Venezuela
(PdVSA)	in	2018	and	2019.
Narcoterrorism
The	March	indictment	of	Maduro	and	other	senior	officials	on	charges	of	narcotrafficking	and	support	for	terrorism
against	the	US	ratchets	up	the	pressure	on	the	Venezuelan	government.	Amongst	other	accusations,	the
Department	of	Justice	contends	that	Maduro	is	a	leader	of	the	so-called	“Cartel	de	los	Soles”	(Cartel	of	the	Suns)
drug	trafficking	organisation	and	has	used	Venezuelan	state	infrastructure	to	conspire	with	the	demobilised	FARC
guerrilla	group	in	Colombia	in	order	“to	flood	the	United	States	with	cocaine	in	order	to	undermine	the	health	and
wellbeing	of	our	nation.”	The	four	different	charges	carry	a	mandatory	minimum	sentence	of	50	years’
imprisonment.
As	I	have	written	elsewhere,	evidence	shows	that	Maduro	and	his	Chavista	political	movement	have	played	major
roles	in	facilitating	organised	crime	and	narcotrafficking	in	Venezuela.	However,	the	indictment	appears	to	stretch
the	concept	of	“narcoterrorism”,	which	is	used	to	link	drug	proceeds	to	the	financing	of	terrorism.	There	is	no
evidence	that	the	Cartel	of	the	Suns	–	the	informal	name	for	a	loose	network	of	military	officers	and	government
officials	engaged	in	competition	over	cocaine	trafficking	routes	–	is	directly	engaged	in	terrorism.	Instead,	the	US
government	makes	the	case	that	the	accused	were	part	of	a	conspiracy	that	worked	with	the	FARC	to	turn
Venezuela	into	a	transshipment	centre	for	moving	cocaine	from	Colombia	to	the	US,	thereby	financing	FARC	terror
activities.
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The	US	Southern	Command	(SOUTHCOM)	began	“enhanced	counter-narcotic	operations”	close	to
Venezuela	in	April	2020	(Department	of	Defense,	public	domain)
Moreover,	although	the	indictment	alleges	the	Venezuelan	officials’	activities	in	narcoterrorism	and	related	crimes
“since	at	least	1999,”	this	is	not	reflected	in	most	prior	public	US	declarations.	The	US	Southern	Command
(USSOUTHCOM)	annual	posture	statements,	which	document	the	combatant	command’s	priorities	in	South
America,	mention	“narcoterrorism”	7	times	between	2001	and	2017—but	always	in	reference	to	Peru	and
Colombia.	The	2018	statement	mentions	the	term	once,	superficially,	in	relation	to	Venezuela,	while	the	2020
Posture	Statement	asserts,	“Maduro	has	allowed	Venezuela	to	become	a	safe	haven	for	the	ELN,	FARC	dissidents,
and	drug	traffickers	while	the	Venezuelan	people	starve”.	If	Maduro	were	facilitating	a	“narco-terrorist”	government,
it	seems	likely	that	more	posture	statements	in	the	past	would	have	mentioned	this	pressing	concern,	à	la	Colombia
or	Peru.
The	US	War	of	Attrition
Regardless,	setting	aside	the	exact	nature	of	the	charges	and	their	legal	merits,	US	actions	clearly	reflect	a
calculation	that	Maduro’s	government	is	vulnerable.	Days	after	the	narco-trafficking	charges,	the	US	State
Department	released	a	proposed	“Democratic	Transition	Framework	for	Venezuela”	in	which	both	Maduro	and
Guaidó	would	step	aside	to	allow	a	new	council	of	state	to	preside	over	presidential	elections.	Unfortunately,
coming	on	the	heels	of	the	indictments,	Maduro	quickly	rejected	the	framework	–	something	likely	to	happen	to	any
US-proposed	plan.
However,	the	US	government	may	see	this	as	a	war	of	attrition.	Economic	sanctions	have	helped	squeeze	the
economy	while	the	recent	crash	in	oil	prices	has	further	reduced	revenues	–	oil	proceeds	have	traditionally
accounted	for	the	vast	majority	of	Venezuela’s	export	earnings	and	state	finances.	Further,	this	comes	against	the
backdrop	of	the	pandemic.	Venezuela	has	reported	only	a	small	number	of	cases,	but	it	is	one	of	the	worst
prepared	countries	in	the	world	to	deal	with	COVID-19.	As	a	result,	in	reference	to	the	indictment,	Attorney	General
Barr	said	the	timing	was	right	precisely	because	“people	are	suffering.”
There	are	further	examples	of	the	US	exercising	maximum	pressure.	At	his	own	COVID-19	briefing	on	1	April,
President	Donald	Trump	announced	that	the	United	States	was	launching	“enhanced	counternarcotics	operations”
in	the	Caribbean	near	Venezuela,	the	scale	of	which	is	particularly	unusual	for	the	region.	Later	in	April,	the	Office
of	Foreign	Assets	Control	(OFAC)	of	the	US	Treasury	issued	licenses	for	Chevron	and	service	operators	in
Venezuela	to	stay	until	December	1,	2020,	but	it	also	barred	the	enterprises	from	new	oil	drilling,	extraction,
refining,	or	capital	expenditures.	In	short,	US	policymakers	are	betting	that	Maduro	will	be	unable	to	outlast	all	these
obstacles.
For	his	part,	Maduro	has	already	created	more	problems.	In	his	scramble	to	quell	growing	discontent	and	protests
over	the	affordability	of	goods	and	a	gasoline	shortage,	he	reinstated	price	control	measures	after	they	had	been
relaxed	starting	last	year.	This	probably	signals	an	increase	in	food	scarcity	and	hunger,	and	it	could	increase
domestic	pressure	for	political	change.	Adding	to	this,	Venezuela	will	have	to	confront	the	wave	of	migrants
returning	from	a	locked-down	Colombia.
The	US	is	not	looking	to	the	long	term
One	immediate	effect	the	indictment	had	was	to	scuttle	preliminary	talks	between	Maduro	and	Guaidó	over	a	partial
truce	that	would	allow	them	to	make	a	joint	appeal	for	international	aid	to	deal	with	COVID-19.	This	obviously	does
not	augur	well	for	the	country’s	immediate	future	or	its	preparation	for	the	arrival	of	the	pandemic.	Official	data	are
unreliable,	but	it	appears	that	Venezuela	has	yet	to	fully	reckon	with	the	spread	of	COVID-19.	The	long-term
implications	are	almost	as	gloomy.	The	new	strategy	seemingly	takes	a	negotiated	solution	to	the	country’s	political
crisis	permanently	off	the	table	by	further	raising	the	exit	costs	for	Maduro	and	his	cronies.
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As	history	has	shown,	the	US	has	been	much	more	effective	at	removing	foreign	dictators	than	rebuilding	those
countries.	Consistent	with	this,	the	broader	US	strategy	seems	single-mindedly	focused	on	removing	Maduro	rather
than	using	the	type	of	diplomacy	and	concessions	that	would	help	to	re-establish	democracy.	So	while	the	depth	of
the	country’s	economic	and	humanitarian	crisis	in	combination	with	sustained	US	pressure	might	destabilise
Maduro,	a	successful	democratic	transition	will	require	some	type	of	negotiated	settlement	as	it	did	in	South	Africa
after	apartheid,	in	Eastern	European	democracies	after	the	Cold	War,	and	in	Latin	America	after	the	dictatorships	of
the	1970s.	That	has	not	been	the	US	focus.
Regardless	of	the	political	outcome,	Venezuela’s	massive	economic	and	humanitarian	crisis	is	likely	to	grow	worse
in	the	months	ahead.	Whoever	governs	will	have	their	hands	full.
	
Notes:
•	The	views	expressed	here	are	of	the	authors	rather	than	the	Centre	or	the	LSE
•	This	post	was	originally	publish	by	LSE	US	Politics	and	Policy	blog
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